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Abstract
Admissible strategies, i.e. those that are not dominated by any other strategy, are a typical
rationality notion in game theory. In many classes of games this is justified by results showing
that any strategy is admissible or dominated by an admissible strategy. However, in games played
on finite graphs with quantitative objectives (as used for reactive synthesis), this is not the case.
We consider increasing chains of strategies instead to recover a satisfactory rationality no-
tion based on dominance in such games. We start with some order-theoretic considerations
establishing sufficient criteria for this to work. We then turn our attention to generalised safe-
ty/reachability games as a particular application. We propose the notion of maximal uniform
chain as the desired dominance-based rationality concept in these games. Decidability of some
fundamental questions about uniform chains is established.
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1 Introduction
The canonical model to formalize the reactive synthesis problem are two-player win/lose
perfect information games played on finite (directed) graphs [22, 1]. In recent years, more
general objectives and multiplayer games have been studied (see e.g. [17] or [7] and additional
references therein). When moving beyond two-player win/lose games, the traditional solution
concept of a winning strategy needs to be updated by another notion. The game-theoretic
literature offers a variety of concepts of rationality to be considered as candidates.
The notion we focus on here is admissibility: roughly speaking, judging strategies according
to this criterion allows to deem rational only strategies that are not worse than any other
strategy (ie, that are not dominated). In this sense, admissible strategies represent maximal
elements in the whole set of strategies available to a player. One attractive feature of
admissibility, or more generally, dominance based rationality notions is that they work on
the level of an individual agent. Unlike e.g. to justify Nash equilibria, no common rationality,
shared knowledge or any other assumptions on the other players are needed to explain why a
specific agent would avoid dominated strategies.
The study of admissibility in the context of games played on graphs was initiated by
Berwanger in [4] and subsequently became an active research topic (e.g. [12, 9, 2, 8, 10],
see related work below). In [4], Berwanger established in the context of perfect-information
games with boolean objectives that admissibility is the good criterion for rationality: every
strategy is either admissible or dominated by an admissible strategy.
Unfortunately, this fundamental property does not hold when one considers quantitative
objectives. Indeed, as soon as there are three different possible payoffs, one can find instances
of games where a strategy is neither dominated by an admissible strategy, nor admissible itself
(see Example 1). This third payoff actually allows for the existence of infinite domination
sequences of strategies, where each element of the sequence dominates its predecessor and
is dominated by its successor in the chain. Consequently, no strategy in such a chain is
admissible. However, it can be the case that no admissible strategy dominates the elements
of the chain. In the absence of a maximal element above these strategies, one may ask why
they should be discarded in the quest of a rational choice. They may indeed represent a type
of behaviour that is rational but not captured by the admissibility criterion.
Our contributions. To formalize this behaviour, we study increasing chains of strategies
(Definition 3). A chain is weakly dominated by some other chain, if every strategy in the
first is below some strategy in the second. The question then arises whether every chain
is below a maximal chain. Based on purely order-theoretic argument, a sufficient criterion
is given in Theorem 11. However, Corollary 17 shows that our sufficient criterion does not
apply to all games of interests. We can avoid the issue by restricting to some countable class
of strategies, e.g. just the regular, computable or hyperarithmetic ones (Corollary 19).
N. Basset, I. Jecker, A. Pauly, J-F. Raskin, and M. Van den Bogaard 10:3
We test the abstract notion in the concrete setting of generalised safety/reachability
games (Definition 21). Based on the observation that the crucial behaviour captured by
chains of strategies, but not by single strategies is Repeat this action a large but finite number
of times, we introduce the notion of a parameterized automaton (Definition 28), which
essentially has just this ability over the standard finite automata. We then show that any
finite memory strategy is below a maximal chain or strategy realized by a parameterized
automaton (Theorem 31).
Finally, we consider some algorithmic properties of chains and parameterized automata
in generalised safety/reachability games. It is decidable in PTime whether a parameterized
automaton realizes a chain of strategies (Theorem 35). It is also decidable in PTime whether
the chain realized by one parameterized automaton dominates the chain realized by another
(Theorem 36).
Most proofs are omitted in the paper due to space restrictions. The appendix contains a
selection of those. For the full account, we refer to the arXiv version [3].
Related work. As mentioned above, the study of dominance and admissibility for games
played on graphs was initiated by Berwanger in [4]. Faella analyzed several criteria for how a
player should play a win/lose game on a finite graph that she cannot win, eventually settling
on the notion of admissible strategy [15].
Admissibility in quantitative perfect-information sequential games played on graphs
was studied in [9]. Concurrent games were considered in [2]. In [8], games with imperfect
information, but boolean objectives were explored. The study of decision problems related to
admissibility (as we do in Subsection 4.3) was advanced in [12]. The complexity of decision
problems related to dominance in normal form games has received attention, see [21] for an
overview. For the role of admissibility for synthesis, we refer to [10].
Our Subsection 3.1 involves an investigation of cofinal chains in certain partially ordered
sets. A similar theme (but with a different focus) is present in [25].
2 Background
2.1 Games on finite graphs
A turn-based multiplayer game G on a finite graph G is a tuple G = 〈P,G, (pi)i∈P 〉 where:
P is the non-empty finite set of players of the game,
G = 〈V,E〉 where the finite set V of vertices of G is equipped with a |P |-partition ]i∈PVi,
and E ⊆ V × V is the edge relation of G,
for each player i in P , pi is a payoff function that associates to every infinite path in G a
payoff in R.
Outcomes and histories. An outcome ρ of G is an infinite path in G, that is, an infinite
sequence of vertices ρ = (ρk)k∈N ∈ V ω, where for all k ∈ N, (ρk, ρk+1) ∈ E. The set of all
possible outcomes in G is denoted Out(G). A finite prefix of an outcome is called a history.
The set of all histories in G is denoted Hist(G). For an outcome ρ = (ρk)k∈N and an integer
`, we denote by ρ≤` the history (ρk)0≤k≤`. The length of the history ρ≤`, denoted |ρ≤`| is
`+ 1. Given an outcome or a history ρ and a history h, we write h ⊆pref ρ if h is a prefix of
ρ, and we denote by h−1.ρ the unique outcome (or history) such that ρ = h.(h−1.ρ). Given
an outcome ρ or a history h and k ∈ N (respectively k < |h|), we denote by ρk (respectively
hk) the k + 1-th vertex of ρ (respectively of h). For a history h, we define the last vertex
of h to be last(h) := h|h|−1 and its first vertex first(h) := h0. For a vertex v ∈ V , its set of
successors is Ev = {v′ ∈ V | (v, v′) ∈ E}.
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Strategy profiles and payoffs. A strategy of a player i is a function σi that associates to
each history h such that last(h) ∈ Vi, a successor state v ∈ Elast(h). A tuple of strategies
(σi)i∈P ′ where P ′ ⊆ P , one for each player in P ′ is called a profile of strategies. Usually,
we focus on a particular player i, thus, given a profile (σi)i∈P , we write σ−i to designate
the collection of strategies of players in P \ {i}, and the complete profile is written (σi, σ−i).
The set of all strategies of player i is denoted Σi(G), while Σ(G) =
∏
i∈P Σi(G) is the
set of all profiles of strategies in the game G and Σ−i(G) is the set of all profiles of all
players except Player i. As we consider games with perfect information and deterministic
transitions, any complete profile σP = (σi)i∈P yields, from any history h, a unique outcome,
denoted Outh(G, σP ). Formally, Outh(G, σP ) is the outcome ρ such that ρ≤|h|−1 = h
and for all k ≥ |h| − 1, for all i ∈ P , its holds that ρk+1 = σi(ρ≤k) if ρk ∈ Vi. The set
of outcomes (resp. histories) compatible with a strategy σ of player i after a history h
is Outh(G, σi) = {ρ ∈ Out(G) | ∃σ−i ∈ Σ−i(G) such that ρ = Outh(G, (σi, σ−i))} (resp.
Histh(σ) = {h ∈ Hist(G) | ∃ρ ∈ Outh(G, σi), n ∈ N such that h = ρ≤n}). Each outcome ρ
yields a payoff pi(ρ) for each Player i. We denote with pi(h, σ, τ) the payoff of a profile of
strategies (σ, τ) after a history h.
Usually, we consider games instances such that players start to play at a fixed vertex.
Thus, we call an initialized game a pair (G, v0) of a game G and a vertex v0 ∈ V . When
the initial vertex v0 is clear from context, we speak directly from G, Out(G, σP ) and pi(σP )
instead of (G, v0), Outv0(G, σP ) and pi(v0, σP ).
Dominance relation. In order to compare different strategies of a player i in terms of
payoffs, we rely on the notion of dominance between strategies: A strategy σ ∈ Σi is weakly
dominated by a strategy σ′ ∈ Σi at a history h compatible with σ and σ′, denoted σ h σ′,
if for every τ ∈ Σ−i, we have pi(h, σ, τ) ≤ pi(h, σ′, τ). We say that σ is weakly dominated
by σ′, denoted σ  σ′ if σ v0 σ′, where v0 is the initial state of G. A strategy σ ∈ Σi is
dominated by a strategy σ′ ∈ Σi, at a history h compatible with σ and σ′, denoted σ ≺h σ′,
if σ h σ′ and there exists τ ∈ Σ−i, such that pi(h, σ, τ) < pi(h, σ′, τ). We say that σ is
dominated by σ′, denoted σ ≺ σ′ if σ ≺v0 σ′, where v0 is the initial state of G. Strategies
that are not dominated by any other strategies are called admissible: A strategy σ ∈ Σi is
admissible (respectively from h) if σ 6≺ σ′ (resp. σ 6≺h σ′) for every σ′ ∈ Σi.
Antagonistic and Cooperative Values. To study the rationality of different behaviours in a
game G, it is useful to be able to know, for a player i, a fixed strategy σ ∈ Σi and any history
h, the worst possible payoff Player i can obtain with σ from h (i.e., the payoff he will obtain
assuming the other players play antagonistically), as well as the best possible payoff Player i
can hope for with σ from h (i.e., the payoff he will obtain assuming the other players play
cooperatively). The first value is called the antagonistic value of the strategy σ of Player i at
history h in G and the second value is called the cooperative value of the strategy σ of Player i
at history h in G. They are formally defined as aVali(G, h, σ) := infτ∈Σ−i pi(Outh(σ, τ)) and
cVali(G, h, σ) := supτ∈Σ−i pi(Outh(σ, τ)).
Prior to any choice of strategy of Player i, we can define, for any history h, the antagonistic
value of h for Player i as aVali(G, h) := supσ∈Σi aVali(G, h, σ) and the cooperative value of
h for Player i as cVali(G, h) := supσ∈Σi cVali(G, h, σ). Furthermore, one can ask, from a
history h, what is the maximal payoff one can obtain while ensuring the antagonistic value
of h. Thus, we define the antagonistic-cooperative value of h for Player i as acVali(G, h) :=
sup{cVali(G, h, σ) | σ ∈ Σi and aVali(G, h, σ) ≥ aVali(G, h)}. From now on, we will omit to
precise G when it is clear from the context.
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v0 v1 `2`1
Figure 1 The Help-me?-game.
An initialized game (G, v0) is well-formed for Player i if, for every history h ∈ Histv0(G),
there exists a strategy σ ∈ Σi such that aVali(h, σ) = aVal(h), and a strategy σ′ ∈ Σi such
that cVali(h, σ′) = cVal(h). In other words, at every history h, Player i has a strategy that
ensures the payoff aVali(h), and a strategy that allows the other players to cooperate to
yield a payoff of cVali(h).
In the following, we will always focus on the point of view of one player i, thus we will
sometimes refer to him as the protagonist and assume it is the first player, while the other
players −i can be seen as a coalition and abstracted to a single player, that we will call the
antagonist. Furthermore, we will omit the subscript i to refer to the protagonist when we
use the notations aVali, cVali, acVali, pi, etc..
I Example 1. Consider the game depicted in Figure 1. The protagonist owns the circle
vertices. The payoffs are defined as follows for the protagonist :
p(ρ) =

0 if ρ = (v0v1)ω,
1 if ρ = (v0v1)nv0`ω1 where n ∈ N,
2 if ρ = (v0v1)n`ω2 where n ∈ N.
Let us first look at the possible behaviours of the protagonist in this game, when he makes
no assumption on the payoff function of the antagonist. He can choose to be “optimistic”
and opt to try (at least for some time, or forever) to go to v1 in the hope that the antagonist
will cooperate to bring him to `2, or settle from the start and go directly to `1, not counting
on any help from the antagonist. We denote by sk the strategy that prescribes to choose
v1 as the successor vertex at the first k visits of v0, and `1 at the k + 1-th visit, while sω
denotes the strategy that prescribes v1 at every visit of v0.
Fix k ∈ N. Then, sk ≺ sk+1: Indeed, for all τ ∈ Σ−i, if p(sk, τ) = 2, then there exists
j ≤ k such that τ((v0v1)j) = `2. As sk and sk+1 agree up to (v0v1)kq0, we have that
Out(sk+1, τ) = (v0v1)j`ω2 = Out(sk, τ), thus p(sk+1, τ) = 2 as well. Furthermore, consider
a strategy τ such that τ((v0v1)j) = v0 for all j ≤ k and τ((v0v1)k+1) = `2. Then p(sk, τ) = 1
while p(sk+1, τ) = 2. Finally, consider the strategy τ such that τ((v0v1)k) = v0 for all
k ∈ N. Then p(sk, τ) = 1 = p(sk+1, τ). Hence, sk ≺ sk+1. In addition, we observe that sω
is admissible: for any strategy sk, the strategy τ of the antagonist that moves to `2 at the
k + 1-th visit of v1 yields a payoff of 1 against strategy sk but 2 against strategy sω. Thus,
sω 6 sk for any k ∈ N.
Quantitative vs Boolean setting. Remark that in the boolean variant of the Help-me?
game considered in Example 1, where the payoff associated with the vertex `1 is 0 and the
payoff associated with the vertex `2 is 1, every strategy sk for k ∈ N is in fact dominated
by sω, as sk and sω both yield payoff 0 against τ such that τ((v0v1)k) = v0 for all k ∈ N.
In fact, Berwanger in [4], showed that boolean games with ω-regular objectives enjoy the
following fundamental property: every strategy is either admissible, or dominated by an
admissible strategy. The existence of an admissible strategy in any such game follows as an
immediate corollary.
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Let us now illustrate how admissibility fails to capture fully the notion of rational
behaviour in the quantitative case. Firstly, recall that the existence of admissible strategies is
not guaranteed in this setting (see for instance the examples given in [9]). In [9], the authors
identified a class of games for which the existence of admissible strategies (for Player i) is
guaranteed: well-formed games (for Player i). However, even in such games, the desirable
fundamental property that holds for boolean games is not assured to hold anymore. In
fact, this is already true for quantitative well-formed games with only three different payoffs
and really simple payoff functions. Indeed, consider again the Help-me? game in Figure 1.
Remark that it is a well-formed game for the protagonist. We already showed that any
strategy sk is dominated by the strategy sk+1. Thus, none of them is admissible. The only
admissible strategy is sω. It is easy to see that sk 6 sω for any k ∈ N: Let τ ∈ Σ−i be such
that τ((v0v1)k) = v0 for all k ∈ N. Then p(sk, τ) = 1 > 0 = p(sω, τ). To sum up, we see
that there exists an infinite sequence (sk)k∈N of strategies such that none of its elements
is dominated by the only admissible strategy sω. However, the sequence (sk)k∈N is totally
ordered by the dominance relation. Based on these observations, we take the approach to
not only consider single strategies, but also such ordered sequences of strategies, that can
represent a type of rational behaviour not captured by the admissibility concept.
2.2 Order theory
In this paragraph we recall the standard results from order theory that we need (see e.g. [19]).
A linear order is a total, transitive and antisymmetric relation. A linearly ordered set
(R,≺) is a well-order, if every subset of R has a minimal element w.r.t. ≺. The ordinals
are the canonical examples of well-orders, in as far as any well-order is order-isomorphic to
an ordinal. The ordinals themselves are well-ordered by the relation < where α ≤ β iff α
order-embeds into β. The first infinite ordinal is denoted by ω, and the first uncountable
ordinal by ω1.
A partial order is a transitive and reflexive relation. Let (X,) be a partially ordered set
(poset for short). A chain in (X,) is a subset ofX that is totally ordered by . An increasing
chain is an ordinal-indexed family (xβ)β<α of elements of X such that β < γ < α⇒ xβ ≺ xγ .
If we only have that β < γ implies xβ  xγ , we speak of a weakly increasing chain. We
are mostly interested in (weakly) increasing chains in this paper, and will thus occasionally
suppress the words weakly increasing and only speak about chains.
A subset Y of a partially ordered set (X,) is called cofinal, if for every x ∈ X there is
a y ∈ Y with x  y. A consequence of the axiom of choice is that every chain contains a
cofinal increasing chain, which is one reason for our focus on increasing chains. It is obvious
that having multiple maximal elements prevents the existence of a cofinal chain, but even a
lattice can fail to admit a cofinal chain. An example we will go back to is ω1 × ω (cf. [19]).
If (X,) admits a cofinal chain, then its cofinality (denoted by cof(X,)) is the least
ordinal α indexing a cofinal increasing chain in (X,). The possible values of the cofinality
are 1 or infinite regular cardinals (it is common to identify a cardinal and the least ordinal
of that cardinality). In particular, a countable chain can only have cofinality 1 or ω. The
first uncountable cardinal ℵ1 is regular, and cof(ω1) = ω1.
We will need the probably most-famous result from order theory:
I Lemma 2 (Zorn’s Lemma). If every chain in (X,) has an upper bound, then every
element of X is below a maximal element.
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3 Increasing chains of strategies
3.1 Ordering chains
In this subsection, we study the poset of increasing chains in a given poset (X,). We
denote by IC(X,) the set of increasing chains in (X,). Our intended application will be
that (X,) is the set of strategies for the protagonist in a game ordered by the dominance
relation. However, in this subsection we are not exploiting any properties specific to the
game-setting. Instead, our approach is purely order-theoretic.
I Definition 3. We introduce an order v on IC(X,) by defining:
(xβ)β<α v (yγ)γ<δ if ∀β < α ∃γ < δ xβ  yγ
Note that v is a partial order. Let .= denote the corresponding equivalence relation. We
will occasionally write short IC for (IC(X,),v).
Inspired by our application to dominance between strategies in games, we will refer to
both  and v as the dominance relation, and might express e.g. (xβ)β<α v (yγ)γ<δ as
(xβ)β<α is dominated by (yγ)γ<δ, or (yγ)γ<δ dominates (xβ)β<α. There is no risk to confuse
whether  or v is meant, since x  y iff (x)β<1 v (y)γ<1. Continuing the identification of
x ∈ X and (x)β<1 ∈ IC, we will later also speak about a single strategy dominating a chain
or vice versa.
The central notion we are interested in will be that of a maximal chain:
I Definition 4. A ∈ IC is called maximal, if A v B for B ∈ IC implies B v A.
We desire situations where every chain in IC is either maximal or below a maximal chain.
Noting that this goal is precisely the conclusion of Zorn’s Lemma (Lemma 2), we are led to
study chains of chains; for if every chain of chains is bounded, Zorn’s Lemma applies. Since
(IC,v) is a poset just as (X,) is, notions such as cofinality apply to chains of chains just
as they apply to chains. We will gather a number of lemmas we need to clarify when chains
of chains are bounded.
In a slight abuse of notation, we write (xβ)β<α ⊆ (yγ)γ<δ iff {xβ | β < α} ⊆ {yγ | γ < δ}.
Clearly, (xβ)β<α ⊆ (yγ)γ<δ implies (xβ)β<α v (yγ)γ<δ. We can now express cofinality by
noting that (xβ)β<α is cofinal in (yγ)γ<δ iff (xβ)β<α ⊆ (yγ)γ<δ and (yγ)γ<δ v (xβ)β<α. We
recall that the cofinality of (yγ)γ<δ (denoted by cof((yγ)γ<δ) is the least ordinal α such that
there exists some (xβ)β<α which is cofinal in (yγ)γ<δ.
I Lemma 5. If (xβ)β<α
.= (yγ)γ<δ, then there is some (y′λ)λ<α′ ⊆ (yγ)γ<δ with α′ ≤ α and
(y′λ)λ<α′
.= (yγ)γ<δ.
I Corollary 6. cof((yγ)γ<δ) is equal to the least ordinal α such that there exists (xβ)β<α
with (xβ)β<α
.= (yγ)γ<δ.
I Corollary 7. For every chain (yγ)γ<δ there exists an equivalent chain (xβ)β<α such that
α = 1 or α is an infinite regular cardinal. In particular, if δ is countable, then (yγ)γ<δ is
equivalent to a singleton or some chain (xn)n<ω.
We briefly illustrate the concepts introduced so far in the game setting. Notice that for a
game G and a Player i, the pair (Σi(G),) is indeed a partially ordered set. We can thus
consider the set IC(Σi(G),) of increasing chains of strategies in G.
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I Example 8. Recall the Help-me? game of Figure 1 and consider the set (Σi,) of strategies
of the protagonist partially ordered by the weak dominance relation. Any single strategy
is an increasing chain, indexed by the ordinal 1. We already noted that the strategy sω
is admissible, thus the chain consisting of sω is maximal with respect to v. Furthermore,
the sequence of strategies (sk)k<ω is an increasing chain. Indeed, we know that for any
k < ω, we have sk ≺ sk+1. It is a maximal one: in fact, since the set of strategies of the
protagonist solely consists of the strategies of this chain and sω, and as sk 6 sω for any k < ω,
we get that any chain (σβ)β<α such that (sk)k<ω v (σβ)β<α satisfies (σβ)β<α ⊆ (sk)k<ω.
Thus, (σβ)β<α v (sk)k<ω. Let (σβ)β<α be an increasing chain indexed by the ordinal α.
First, remark that α ≤ ω. If α < ω, then the cofinality of (σβ)β<α is 1 as (σβ)β<α is
equivalent to the strategy σα−1: every strategy of (σβ)β<α is weakly dominated by σα−1,
and as the strategy σα−1 is included in the increasing chain (σβ)β<α, it is weakly dominated
by (σβ)β<α. If α = ω, then the cofinality of (σβ)β<α is ω: As for every finite chain (σ′β′)β′<α′
with 1 < α′ < ω, there exists n < ω such that (σ′β′)β′<α′ @ σn, and thus (σβ)β<α is not
(weakly) dominated by (σ′β′)β′<α′ . Moreover, we have that (σβ)β<α
.= (sk)k<ω and is thus
maximal. Indeed, since (σβ)β<α is a chain that is not a singleton, we already know that
(σβ)β<α ⊆ (sk)k<ω, that is (σβ)β<α v (sk)k<ω. Let now k < ω. As (σβ)β<α is an increasing
chain and α = ω, we have that there exists n < ω and k′ ≥ k such that σn = sk′ . Thus,
sk  σn since (sk)k<ω is an increasing chain. Hence, we also have (sk)k<ω v (σβ)β<α.
Now we are ready to prove the main technical result of this section 3.1, which identifies
the potential obstructions for each chain in IC to have an upper bound:
I Lemma 9. The following are equivalent:
1. If ((xγβ)β<αγ )γ<δ is an increasing chain in IC, then it has an upper bound in IC.
2. If ((xγβ)β<α)γ<δ is an increasing chain in IC with α 6= δ, cof((x
γ
β)β<α) = α > 1 and
cof(((xγβ)β<α)γ<δ) = δ > 1, then it has an upper bound in IC.
Let us illustrate the problem of extending Lemma 9 by an example:
I Example 10 ([19, Example 1]). Let (X,) = ω1 × ω, i.e. the product order of the first
uncountable ordinal and the first infinite ordinal. Consider the chain of chains given by
xγn = (γ, n), this corresponds to the case α = ω, δ = ω1 in Lemma 9. If this chain of chains
had an upper bound, then ω1 × ω would need to admit a cofinal chain. However, this is not
the case.
However, we can guarantee the existence of a maximal chain above any chain when there
is no uncountable increasing chain of increasing chains.
I Theorem 11. If all increasing chains of elements in IC (i.e., increasing chains of increasing
chains of elements of (X,)) have a countable number of elements, then for every A ∈ IC
there exists a maximal B ∈ IC with A v B.
Proof. We first argue that Condition 2 in Lemma 9 is vacuously true. As all increasing
chains in IC are countable, the only possible value δ > 1 for δ = cof(((xγβ)β<α)γ<δ) is δ = ω.
As (X,) embeds into IC, if all chains in IC are countable, then so are all chains in (X,).
This tells us that the only possible value for α is α = ω. But then α 6= δ cannot be satisfied.
By Lemma 9, Condition 1 follows. We can then apply Zorn’s Lemma (Lemma 2) to
conclude the claim. J
A small modification of the example shows that we cannot replace the requirement that
IC has only countable increasing chains in Theorem 11 with the simpler requirement that
(X,) has only countable increasing chains:
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v0
v1 v2 `2`1
(a) A variant of the Help-me? game with an extra
loop.
v0
v1
v2 `2`1
b
a
(b) A variant of the Help-me? game with two paths
from v0 to v2.
Figure 2 Two variants of the Help-me? game.
I Example 12. Let X = ω1 × ω, and let (α, n) ≺ (β,m) iff α ≤ β and n < m. Then (X,)
has only countable increasing chains, but IC still has the chain of chains given by xγn = (γ, n)
as in Example 10.
3.2 Uncountably long chains of chains
Unfortunately, we can design a game such that there exists an uncountable increasing chain
of increasing chains. Thus the existence of a maximal element above any chain is not
guaranteed by Theorem 11. In fact, we will see that the chain of chains of uncountable length
we construct is not below any maximal chain.
I Example 13. We consider a variant of the Help-me? game (Example 1), depicted in
Figure 2a. The strategies of the protagonist in this game can be described by functions
f : N→ N ∪ {∞} describing how often the protagonist is willing to repeat the second loop
(between v1 and v2) given the number of repetitions the antagonist made in the first loop (at
v0). With the same reasoning as in Example 1 we find that the strategy corresponding to a
function g dominates the strategy corresponding to f iff ∀n ∈ N f(n) =∞⇔ g(n) =∞ and
∀n ∈ Nf(n) ≤ g(n).
I Definition 14. Let NN denote the set of functions f : N → N. For f, g ∈ NN, let f ≤ g
denote that ∀n ∈ N f(n) ≤ g(n).
I Observation 15. There is an embedding of (NN,≤) into the strategies of the game in
Example 13 ordered by dominance such that no strategy in the range of embedding is
dominated by a strategy outside the range of the embedding.
I Proposition 16 (1). For every chain (fn)n∈N in (NN,≤) there exists a chain of chains
((fαn )n<ω)α<ω1 of length ω1 with (f0n)n<ω w (fn)n<ω.
I Corollary 17. The game in Example 13 has uncountably long chains of chains not below
any maximal chains.
Proof. Combine Observation 15 and Proposition 16. J
1 This result is adapted from an answer by user Deedlit on math.stackexchange.org [16].
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3.3 Chains over countable posets (X,)
Our proof of Proposition 16 crucially relied on functions of type f : N→ N with arbitrarily
high rate of growth. In concrete applications such functions would typically be unwelcome. In
fact, for almost all classes of games of interest in (theoretical) computer science, a countable
collection of strategies suffices for the players to attain their attainable goals. Restricting
to computable strategies often makes sense. Many games played on finite graphs are even
finite-memory determined (see [18] for how this extends to the quantitative case), and thus
strategies implementable by finite automata are all that need to be considered.
Restricting consideration to a countable set of strategies indeed circumvents the obstacle
presented by Proposition 16. The reason is that the cardinality of the length of a chain of
chains cannot exceed that of the underlying partially ordered set (X,):
I Proposition 18. For any increasing chain ((xγβ)β<α)γ<δ in IC(X,) we find that |δ| ≤ |X|.
Proof. Let Xγ = {x ∈ X | ∃β < α x  xγβ}. We find that Xγ1 ( Xγ2 for any γ1 < γ2 < δ
as a direct consequence of (xγ1β )β<α @ (x
γ2
β )β<α. Pick for each γ < δ some yγ ∈ Xγ+1 \Xγ .
Then y· : δ → X is an injection, establishing |δ| ≤ |X|. J
I Corollary 19. If (X,) is countable, then any increasing chain is maximal or below a
maximal chain.
Proof. Proposition 18 shows that Theorem 11 applies. J
I Example 20. We return to the Help-me? game (Example 1, Figure 1). With the analysis
done in Example 8, we have seen that any increasing chain C is either maximal or such that
C v (σn)n<ω, which is maximal. This fact can be derived directly from Corollary 19 as the
number of strategies in G is countable. Note also that the seemingly irrelevant loop we added
in Figure 2a has a fundamental impact on the behaviour of chains of strategies!
4 Generalised safety/reachability games
I Definition 21. A generalised safety/reachability game (for Player i) G = 〈P,G,L, (pi)i∈P 〉
is a turn-based multiplayer game on a finite graph such that:
L ⊆ V is a finite set of leaves,
for each ` ∈ L, we have that (`, v) ∈ E if, and only if v = `, that is, each leaf is equipped
with a self-loop, and no other outgoing transition,
for each ` ∈ L, there exists an associated payoff n` ∈ Z such that: for each outcome ρ,
we have pi(ρ) =
{
n` if ρ ∈ V ∗`ω,
0 otherwise.
The traditional reachability games can be recovered as the special case where all leaves
are associated with the same positive payoff, whereas the traditional safety games are those
generalised safety/reachability games with a single negative payoff attached to leaves. This
class was studied under the name chess-like games in [5, 6].
Generalised safety/reachability games are well-formed for Player i. Furthermore, they
are prefix-independent, that is, for any outcome ρ and history h, we have that pi(hρ) = pi(ρ).
Without loss of generality, we consider that there is either a unique leaf `(n) ∈ L or no leaf
for each possible payoff n ∈ Z.
It follows from the transfer theorem in [18] (in fact, already from the weaker transfer
theorem in [13]) that generalised safety/reachability games are finite memory determined.
With a slight modification, we see that for any history h and strategy σ, there exists a
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finite-memory strategy σ′ such that cVal(h, σ′) = cVal(h, σ) and aVal(h, σ′) = aVal(h, σ).
We shall thus restrict our attention to finite memory strategies, of which there are only
countably many. We then obtain immediately from Corollary 19:
I Corollary 22. In a generalised safety/reachability game, every increasing chain comprised
of finite memory strategies is either maximal or dominated by a maximal such chain.
If our goal is only to obtain a dominance-related notion of rationality, then for generalised
safety/reachability games we can be satisfied with maximal chains comprised of finite memory
strategies. However, for applications, it would be desirable to have a concrete understanding
of these maximal chains. For this, having used Zorn’s Lemma in the proof of their existence
surely is a bad omen!
After collecting some useful lemmas on dominance in generalised safety/reachability
games in Section 4.1, we will introduce the notion of uniform chains in Section 4.2. These
are realized by automata of a certain kind, and thus sufficiently concrete to be amenable to
algorithmic manipulations.
4.1 Dominance in generalised safety/reachability games
Given a generalised safety/reachability game G and two strategies σ1 and σ2 of Player i, we
can provide a criterion to show that σ1 is not dominated by σ2:
I Lemma 23. Let σ1 and σ2 be two strategies of Player i in a generalised safety/reachability
game G. Then, σ1 6 σ2 if, and only if, there exists a history h compatible with σ1 and σ2
such that last(h) ∈ Vi, σ1(h) 6= σ2(h) and cVal(h, σ1) > aVal(h, σ2).
Intuitively, if there is no history where the two strategies disagree, they are in fact
equivalent, and if, at every history where they disagree, the best payoff σ1 can achieve (that
is, cVal(h, σ1)) is less than the one σ2 can ensure (that is, aVal(h, σ2)), then σ1  σ2. On
the other hand, if they disagree at a history h and the best payoff σ1 can achieve is strictly
greater than the one σ2 can ensure, then there exist a strategy of the antagonist that will
yield exactly these payoffs against σ1 and σ2 respectively, which means that σ1 6 σ2. This
result follows from the proof of Theorem 11 in [9]. The proof adapted to our setting can be
found in the appendix.
We call such a history h a non-dominance witness of σ1 by σ2. The existence of non-
dominance witnesses allows us to conclude that in generalised safety/reachability games, all
increasing chains are countable (not just those comprised of finite memory strategies).
I Corollary 24. If (σβ)β<α is an increasing chain in generalised safety/reachability game,
then α is countable.
Proof. Assume that a history h is a witness of non-dominance of σ2 by σ1, and of σ3 by σ2,
but not of σ1 by σ2 or σ2 by σ3. Then cVal(h, σ2) > aVal(h, σ1), cVal(h, σ3) > aVal(h, σ2),
cVal(h, σ1) ≤ aVal(h, σ2) and cVal(h, σ2) ≤ aVal(h, σ3). It follows that aVal(h, σ1) <
aVal(h, σ3) and cVal(h, σ1) < cVal(h, σ3). Thus, if there are k different possible values, then
any increasing chain of strategies using h as witness of non-dominance between them can
have length at most 2k − 1.
But if there were an uncountably long increasing chain, by the pigeon hole principle it
would have an uncountably long subchain where all non-dominance witnesses in the reverse
direction are given by the same history. J
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As we only handle countable chains, in the following we use the usual notation (σn)n∈N
to index chains.
The following lemma states that we can also extract witnesses for a strategy to be
non-maximal (non-admissible or strictly dominated):
I Lemma 25. Let G be a generalised safety/reachability game and σ a strategy of Player i.
The strategy σ is not admissible if, and only if there exists a history h compatible with σ such
that aVal(h, σ) ≤ cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h) ≤ acV al(h) where at least one inequality is strict.
This result is a reformulation of Theorem 11 in [9] catered to our context and with a
focus on the non-admissibility rather than on admissibility (see the arXiv version [3] for a
proof adapted to our setting).
I Definition 26. Call a history h as in Lemma 25 a non-admissibility witness for σ. Call
σ preadmissible, if for every non-admissibility witness hv of σ we find that h = h′vh′′ with
aVal(h′v, σ) = aVal(h′v) and cVal(h′v, σ) = acV al(h′v).
While a preadmissible strategy may fail to be admissible, it is not possible to improve
upon it the first time it enters some vertex. Only when returning to a vertex later it may
make suboptimal choices. Moreover, before a dominated choice is possible at a vertex,
previously both the antagonistic and the antagonistic-cooperative value were realized at that
vertex by the preadmissible strategy.
I Lemma 27. In a generalised safety/reachability game, every strategy is either preadmissible
or dominated by a preadmissible strategy.
Proof sketch. Essentially, we can change how a strategy behaves locally on those histories
that are an obstacle to it being preadmissible by replacing by a finite memory strategy that
realizes the antagonistic and the antagonistic-cooperative value there. J
4.2 Parameterized automata and uniform chains
Let a parameterized automaton be a Mealy automaton that in addition can access a single
counter in the following way: In a counter-access-state, a transition is chosen based on
whether the counter value is 0 or not. Furthermore, in these counter-access-states, when the
counter value is greater than 0, the counter is decremented by 1, otherwise, it stays at 0. In
the remaining states, only one transition is possible and the counter value is not affected.
I Definition 28. A parameterized automaton for Player i ∈ P over a game graph G = (V,E)
is a tupleM = (M,MC ,m0, V, µ, ν) where:
M is a non-empty finite set of memory states and MC ⊆M is the set of counter-access
states,
m0 is the initial memory state,
V is the set of vertices of G,
µ : M × V × N→M × N is the memory and counter update function,
ν : M ×Vi×N→ V is the move choice function for Player i, such that (v, ν(m, v, n)) ∈ E
for all m ∈M and v ∈ Vi and n ∈ N.
The memory and counter-update function µ respects the following conditions: for each
m ∈M \MC , and v ∈ V , there exists m′ ∈M such that µ(m, v, n) = (m′, n) for all n ∈ N.
for each m ∈ MC , and v ∈ V , there exists m′ ∈ M such that µ(m, v, n) = (m′, n − 1) for
all n > 0 and m′′ ∈M such that µ(m, v, 0) = (m′′, 0). The move choice function ν respects
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Figure 3 Product of the Help-me? game with parameterized automaton with a single memory
state realizing (sk)k∈N.
the following conditions: for each m ∈ M \MC , and v ∈ Vi, there exists v′ ∈ V such that
ν(m, v, n) = v′ for all n ∈ N. For each m ∈MC , and v ∈ Vi, there exists v′, v′′ ∈ V such that
ν(m, v, n) = v′ for all n > 0 and ν(m, v, 0) = v′′.
To ease presentation and understanding, we call transitions that decrement the counter
green transitions, the transitions only taken when the counter value is 0 red transitions,
and the ones that do not depend on the counter value black transitions. This classification
between green, red and black transitions extends naturally to the edges of the productM×G
(that is, the graph with set of vertices M × V and edges induced by the functions µ and ν).
Parameterized automata can be seen as a collection of finite Mealy automata, one for
each initialization of the counter. Thus, we say that a parameterized automatonM realizes
a sequence of finite-memory strategies (σn)n∈N. In the remainder of the paper, we focus on
chains realized by parameterized automata:
I Definition 29. Let a chain (σn)n∈N of strategies be called a uniform chain if there is
a parameterized automaton M that realizes σn if the counter is initialized with the value
n. If (σn)n∈N is maximal for v amongst the increasing chains comprised of finite memory
strategies, we call it a a maximal uniform chain.
I Example 30. The Help-me? game from Figure 1 is clearly a generalised safety/reachability
game with two leaves. The chain of strategies (sk)k∈N exposed in Example 1 is a uniform
chain, as it is realized by the parameterized automaton that loops k times when its counter is
initialized with value k. Figure 3 shows the product between this parameterized automaton
and the game graph. The green (doubled) edge corresponds to the transition to take when
the counter value is greater than 0 and should be decremented, while the red (dashed) edge
corresponds to the transition to take when the counter value is 0.
The following theorem shows us that uniform chains indeed suffice to realize any rational
behaviour in the sense of maximal chains:
I Theorem 31. In a generalised safety/reachability game, every dominated finite memory
strategy is dominated by an admissible finite memory strategy or by a maximal uniform chain.
Theorem 31 cannot be extended to state that every chain comprised of finite memory
strategies is below an admissible strategy or a maximal uniform chain. Note that there are
only countably many uniform chains.
I Example 32. There is a generalised safety/reachability game where there are uncountably
many incomparable maximal chains of finite memory strategies.
Proof. Consider the game depicted in Figure 2b. For any p ∈ {a, b}ω, define a chain of finite
memory strategies by letting the n-strategy be loop n times while playing the symbols from
p≤n, then quit. For each p, we obtain a different maximal chain. J
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4.3 Algorithmic properties
In this section, we prove two decidability results concerning parametrized automata.
First, we prove that we can decide whether the sequence of strategies realized by a
parameterized automaton is a chain. Note that this decision problem is not trivial: not every
parameterized automaton realizes an (increasing) chain of strategies. For instance, if we
switch the red and green transitions in the automaton/game graph product of figure 3, the
sequence of strategies realized consists of sω when the counter is initialized with value 0, and
s0 when it is initialized with any other value. As sω 6 s0, it is not a chain.
Second, we demonstrate that we can compare uniform chains: given two parametrized
automata defining chains of strategies, we can decide whether one is dominated by the other.
We begin by proving that strategies realized by Mealy automata are comparable.
I Lemma 33. Let G be a generalised safety/reachability game, let σ and σ′ be finite-memory
strategies realized by the finite Mealy automataM andM′. It is decidable in PTime whether
σ  σ′.
Proof sketch. We construct the game G′ of perfect information for two players, Challenger
and Prover, such that Prover wins the game if and only if σ  σ′. The goal of Challenger
is to show that there exists a non-dominance witness of σ by σ′, that is, according to
Lemma 23, a history h compatible with σ and σ′ such that last(h) ∈ Vi, σ(h) 6= σ′(h) and
cVal(h, σ) > aVal(h, σ′). The game can be decomposed into the following phases:
first, Challenger chooses a path h̃ in M× G ×M′ such that h̃ has no successor in
M×G×M′. This guarantees that h is compatible with σ and σ′, and that σ(h) 6= σ′(h).
Challenger then announces two values: c and a, such that c > a.
Prover now can choose to contest either value c or value a.
If Prover chooses to contest c, the game proceeds to a subgame C, where Challenger has to
find a continuation path in (M×G) that yields a payoff c, to prove that cVal(h, σ) ≥ c.
If Prover chooses to contest a, the game proceeds to a subgame A, where Challenger
has to find a valid continuation path in (M′ ×G) that yields a payoff a, to prove that
aVal(h, σ′) ≤ a.
Informally, if σ 6 σ′, Challenger is able to select correctly a non-dominance witness h of σ
by σ′, and the two values c = cVal(h, σ) and a = aVal(h, σ′) such that c > a. Thus, he can
follow in G′ the path h̃ corresponding to h, then continue, depending on the choice of Prover,
to follow either a continuation of h that yields a payoff c with strategy σ or a continuation
of h that yields a payoff a with strategy σ′. Symmetrically, if σ  σ′, then for any history h
compatible with σ and σ′ where σ(h) 6= σ′(h), we have that cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h, σ′). Thus
any choice of pair (c, a) with c > a by Challenger is faulty: either c > cVal(h, σ), in which
case Prover can let the game proceed to C, and Challenger will fail to expose a continuation
of h that yields a payoff c with strategy σ′ , or a < aVal(h, σ′), in which case Prover can
let the game proceed to A, and Challenger will fail expose a continuation of h that yields
a payoff a with strategy σ′. As the game graph we construct for this Prover game has a
size polynomial in the size of the strategy automata and the game graph, and as solving
this game amounts to solving a polynomially bounded number of reachability and safety
subgames, we obtain that the question whether σ  σ′ is decidable in PTime. J
We now expose equivalences between the decision problems we are interested in, and
properties (P1), (P2) and (P3) that can be decided with the use of Lemma 33.
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I Proposition 34. Let G be a generalised safety/reachability game over a graph G. LetM be
a Mealy automaton realizing a finite memory strategy M , and let S and T be parameterized
automata realizing sequences (Sn)n∈N and (Tn)n∈N of finite memory strategies. Then:
1. Let N = |G||S|.
Then (Sn)n∈N is a chain if and only if (P1) Si  Si+1 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
2. Let NT = |G||T |(|M|+ 1) + 1, and suppose that (Tn)n∈N is a chain.
Then M 6v (Tn)n∈N if and only if (P2) M 6 TNT .
3. Let NS = |G||S|(2|T |+ 1), and suppose that (Sn)n∈N and (Tn)n∈N are chains.
Then (Sn)n∈N 6v (Tn)n∈N if and only if (P3) SNS 6 (Tn)n∈N.
Proof sketch. Note that for every item, the backward implication is straightforward. The
proof of each forward implication relies on the study of the loops that appear in witnesses
of non dominance, whose existence is guaranteed by Lemma 23. For item 1, we prove that,
given a witness of non-dominance of Ti by Ti+1 for any integer i > N, we are able to
construct a witness of non-dominance of Tj by Tj+1 for some j ≤ N by exposing loops that
can be pumped down.
To prove item 2, we show that since (Tn)n∈N is a chain, M 6v (Tn)n∈N if and only if M is
not dominated by TN for arbitrarily large N . If M is dominated by TNT , we exhibit a loop
in a witness of non dominance, which, once pumped, allows us to create witnesses of non
dominance of M by TN for arbitrarily large N , yielding the desired result.
Finally, item 3 is proved as follows. Since (Sn)n∈N and (Tn)n∈N are chains, (Sn)n∈N 6v
(Tn)n∈N if and only if there exists and integer N such that SN 6v (Tn)n∈N. Once again, we
show that if such an N exists, there is at least one that is smaller than NS . J
Since the property P1 can be decided in PTime by applying Lemma 33 with adequately
chosen Mealy automata as parameters, we obtain the following theorem.
I Theorem 35. Given a generalised safety/reachability game and a parameterized automaton,
we can decide in PTime whether the automaton realizes a chain of strategies.
Similarly, the property P2 can be decided in PTime by applying Lemma 33 with M
and the Mealy automaton corresponding to the strategy TNT as parameters. Moreover, by
Proposition 34.2, the problem of deciding property P3 can be reduced in polynomial time to
the problem of deciding property P2. Therefore Proposition 34.3 implies our final decidability
result.
I Theorem 36. Given a generalised safety/reachability game and two parameterized automata
realizing uniform chains of strategies, we can decide in PTime whether the chain realized by
the first is dominated by the one from the second.
5 Conclusion and outlook
In quantitative games with more than three possible payoffs, there are strategies that are
dominated but not dominated by any admissible strategy. Example 1 suggests that chains
of strategies could provide a suitable framework to circumvent this issue. Abstract order-
theoretic considerations revealed that in the most general case, this does not work. However,
if we restrict to countable collections of strategies, every chain is below a maximal chain.
This restriction is very natural, as it covers all computable strategies.
We explored the abstract approach in the concrete setting of generalized safety/reachability
games. Here, parameterized automata can give a very concrete meaning to chains of
strategies. Several fundamental algorithmic questions are decidable in PTime. There are
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more algorithmic questions to investigate: first and foremost, deciding, given a parameterized
automaton, whether the chain realized is maximal or not, is a relevant question left open.
Moreover, our results on this class of games mostly rely on the prefix-independence and
finite-range of the payoff function, and on the restriction to finite-memory strategies. Thus, it
seems achievable to extend our approach to other classes of games that enjoy these properties,
such as quantitative extensions of parity or Muller games, in the sense of [20] and [24]. A
more ambitious objective would be to tackle more general classes of games, starting by
dropping the finite-range hypothesis to encompass, for instance, mean-payoff games [14].
Finally, in the boolean case, in addition to the fundamental property that a strategy is
either admissible or dominated by an admissible strategy, the admissibility notion exhibits
other good properties. Indeed, in [4], the author proves that, in games with ω-regular
winning conditions on finite graphs, the set of admissible strategies is itself an ω-regular set.
Furthermore, as shown in [11], assuming all the players are rational (that is, play admissible
strategies) yields robust and resilient solutions for strategy synthesis.
This synthesis problem remains to be investigated in the quantitative setting.
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Here we present some, but not all omitted proofs. For the complete account, we refer to
the arXiv version at [3].
A Proofs omitted from Section 3
I Lemma 37. If (xβ)β<α v (yγ)γ<δ and α < cof((yγ)γ<δ), then there exists γ0 < δ such
that
(xβ)β<α v (yγi)i<1
Proof of Lemma 9. It is clear that 2 is a special case of 1. We thus just need to show that
any potential obstruction to 1 can be assumed to have the form in 2.
CSL 2018
10:18 Dominance Between Chains of Strategies
By replacing each (xγβ)β<αγ with some suitable cofinal increasing chain if necessary, we
can assume that cof((xγβ)β<αγ ) = αγ for all γ < δ.
Consider {(xγβ)β<αγ | ∃γ′ > γ αγ < αγ′}. If this set is cofinal in ((x
γ
β)β<αγ )γ<δ, then for
each γ inside that set pick some witness γ′, and let yγ be the witness obtained from Lemma
37. Now {yγ | ∃γ′ > γ αγ < αγ′} is the desired upper bound.
If the set from the paragraph above is not cofinal, then there exists some δ′ < δ such that
for δ′ ≤ γ < γ′ < δ we always have that αγ ≥ αγ′ . As the αγ are ordinals, decreases can
happen only finitely many times. Thus, by moving to a suitable cofinal subset we can safely
assume that all αγ are equal to some fixed α.
Again by moving to a suitable cofinal subset, we can assume that cof(((xγβ)β<α)γ<δ) = δ.
If δ = 1, the statement is trivial. If α = 1, then (xγ0)γ<δ is the desired upper bound. It
remains to handle the case α = δ > 1.
We construct some function f : α→ α, such that the desired upper bound (yε)ε<α is of
the form yε = xεf(ε). We proceed as follows: Set f(0) = 0. Once f(ζ) has been defined for
all ζ < ε, pick for each ζ < ε some g(ζ) such that xζf(ζ)  x
ε
g(ζ) and xζε  xεg(ζ). As ε < α, it
cannot be that {xεg(ζ) | ζ < ε} is cofinal in {xεβ | β < α}. Thus, it has some upper bound,
and we define f(ε) such that xεf(ε) is such an upper bound. J
Proof of Proposition 16. For each countable limit ordinal α, we fix2 some fundamental
sequence (α[m])m<ω of ordinals with α[m] < α and supm∈ω α[m] = α.
Let f0n(k) = max{f(k), k}. Let fα+1n (k) = maxj≤k(fαn+j)(k) + 1, and for limit ordinals α,
let fαn (k) = maxm≤n+k f
α[m]
n (k).
Claim: If α ≤ β, then (fαn )n<ω v (fβm)m<ω.
Proof. It suffices to show that if α ≤ β, then fαn ≤ fβn for all n greater than some t. If
β = α+ 1, this is immediate already for t = 0. For β a limit ordinal, we note that fβ[m]n ≤ fβn
for n ≥ m.
The claim then follows by induction over β. Recall that if β is a limit ordinal and α < β,
then there is some m ∈ ω with α ≤ β[m]. Since for any given α, β, the ordinals γ between
α and β we will need to inspect in the induction form a decreasing chain, there are only
finitely many such ordinals. In particular, the maximum of all thresholds t we encounter is
well-defined. J
Claim: If α > β, then (fαn )n<ω 6v (fβm)m<ω.
Proof. Due to transitivity of v and the previous claim, it suffices to show that (fα+1m )m<ω 6v
(fαn )n<ω. Write gn = fαn . Assume the contrary, i.e. that for all n < ω there exists some
m < ω such that for all k ∈ N and for all j ≤ k we have that gn+j(k) + 1 ≤ gm(k). In
particular, for n = 0 we would have that ∀k ∈ N ∀j ≤ k gj(k) + 1 ≤ gm(k), and then setting
k = j = m, that gm(m) + 1 ≤ gm(m), which is a contradiction. J
J
2 We have no computability or other uniformity requirements to satisfy, and can thus just invoke the
axiom of choice. Otherwise, as discussed e.g. in [23, Section 3.1] this approach would fail.
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B Proofs omitted from Subsection 4.1
Proof of Lemma 23.
=⇒ Suppose that for every history h compatible with σ1 and σ2 such that last(h) ∈ Vi and
σ1(h) 6= σ2(h), we have that cVal(h, σ1) ≤ aVal(h, σ2). We show that σ1  σ2. Let τ
be a strategy of Player −i. Consider ρ1 = Out(σ1, τ) and ρ2 = Out(σ2, τ). If for all
prefixes h′ ⊆pref ρ1 such that last(h′) ∈ Vi, it holds that σ1(h′) = σ2(h′), then in fact
ρ1 = ρ2 and pi(σ1, τ) = pi(σ2, τ). Otherwise, let h be the least common prefix of ρ1 and
ρ2 such that last(h) ∈ Vi and σ1(h) 6= σ2(h). We know that pi(ρ1) ≤ cVal(h, σ1) and
pi(ρ2) ≥ aVal(h, σ2) since h ⊆pref ρ1 and h ⊆pref ρ2. As cVal(h, σ1) ≤ aVal(h, σ2), we
have that pi(σ1, τ) ≤ pi(σ2, τ). Thus, for every τ ∈ Σ−i, it holds that pi(σ1, τ) ≤ pi(σ2, τ),
that is, σ1  σ2.
⇐= Let h be a history compatible with σ1 and σ2 such that last(h) ∈ Vi, σ1(h) 6= σ2(h)
and cVal(h, σ1) > aVal(h, σ2). Then, there exists two strategies τ1 and τ2 of player −i
such that pi(h, σ1, τ1) = cVal(h, σ1) and pi(h, σ2, τ2) = aVal(h, σ2). Let τ be a strategy
of player −i compatible with h, and define τ ′(h′) =

τ1(h′) if hσ1(h) ⊆pref h′,
τ2(h′) if hσ2(h) ⊆pref h′,
τ(h′) otherwise.
The strategy τ ′ is well defined, as σ1(h) 6= σ2(h). Furthermore, we have that pi(σ1, τ ′) =
pi(h, σ1, τ1) = cVal(h, σ1) > aVal(h, σ2) = pi(h, σ2, τ2) = pi(σ2, τ ′), since generalised
safety/reachability games are prefix-independent. Thus, σ1 6 σ2. J
Proof of Lemma 27. For each vertex v in the game, we fix a finite memory strategy τv that
realizes aVal(v) and acV al(v). Note that since generalised safety/reachability games are
prefix independent, values depend only on the current vertex, but not on the entire history.
We start with a finite memory strategy σ. If it is not already preadmissible, then it has
witnesses of non-admissibility violating the desired property. Whether a history h is a witness
of non-admissibility for a finite memory strategy σ depends only on the last vertex of h and
the current state of σ. We now modify σ such that whenever σ is in a combination of vertex
v and state s corresponding to a problematic witness of non-admissibility, the new strategy
σ′ moves to playing τv instead. The choices of v, s and τk ensure that σ′ dominates σ.
The new strategy σ′ may fail to be preadmissible, again, and we repeat the construction.
Now any problematic history in σ′ needs to enter the automaton for some τv at some point.
By choice of τv, the history where τv has just been entered cannot be a witness of non-
admissibility. It follows that a problematic history entering τv cannot end in v. Repeating
the updating process for at most as many times as there are vertices in the game graph will
yield a preadmissible finite memory strategy dominating σ. J
C Proofs omitted from Subsection 4.2
To complete the proof of Theorem 31, we need the following intermediary results:
I Lemma 38. If h is not a witness of non-admissibility of σ, and not a witness of non-
dominance of σ by τ , then h is not a witness of non-dominance of τ by σ.
I Lemma 39. Given an initialized game with initial vertex v0, the following holds: If for two
strategies σ and τ it holds that for any maximal history h compatible with both, there is a prefix
h′ with aVal(h′, σ) = aVal(h′, τ) and cVal(h′, σ) = cVal(h′, τ), then aVal(v0, σ) = aVal(v0, τ)
and cVal(v0, σ) = cVal(v0, τ).
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I Lemma 40. Given an initialized game with initial vertex v0, the following holds: If σ is
preadmissible and σ  τ , then aVal(v0, σ) = aVal(v0, τ) and cVal(v0, σ) = cVal(v0, τ).
Proof. We show that the conditions of Lemma 39 are satisfied, which will imply our desired
conclusion. Consider a maximal history h compatible with both σ and τ . First, assume that
h is not a witness of non-admissibility of σ. Since σ  τ , by Lemma 23 h cannot be a witness
of non-dominance of σ by τ , i.e. cVal(h, σ) ≤ aVal(h, τ). By Lemma 38, it follows that h is
not a witness of non-dominance of τ by σ either, i.e. cVal(h, τ) ≤ aVal(h, σ). Put together,
we have aVal(h, σ) = cVal(h, σ) = aVal(h, τ) = cVal(h, τ).
It remains the case where h is a witness of non-admissibility of σ. Then by preadmissibility
of σ, h has some prefix h′ with aVal(h′, σ) = aVal(h′) and cVal(h′, σ) = acVal(h′). Since σ 
τ , we must have aVal(h′, σ) ≤ aVal(h′, τ), so it follows that aVal(h′, σ) = aVal(h′, τ), and then
that cVal(h′, τ) ≤ acVal(h′) = cVal(h′, σ) ≤ cVal(h′, τ), i.e. cVal(h′, σ) = cVal(h′, τ). J
Proof of Theorem 31. By Lemma 27 it suffices to prove the claim for preadmissible strategies
(Definition 26). We thus start with a preadmissible finite memory strategy σ.
Preliminaries. Since we are working with prefix-independent outcomes and strategies re-
alized by automata, we see that any of the values of σ at some history h depends only on
the final vertex v of h and the state s the strategy σ is in after reading h. We can thus
overload our notation to write aVal(v, s) for aVal(h, σ) and aVal(v) for aVal(h), and so on.
In particular, whether some history h is a witness of non-admissibility of σ or not depends
only on the final vertex v of h and the state s that σ is in after reading h. Let WNA be the
set of such pairs (v, s) corresponding to non-admissibility witnesses. By the definition of
preadmissibility, we cannot reach any (v, s) ∈WNA without first passing through some (v, sv)
with aVal(v, sv) = aVal(v) and cVal(v, sv) = acV al(v, sv). By expanding the automaton if
necessary (to remember where we were when first encountering some vertex), we can assume
that for any (v, s) ∈WNA there is canonic choice of prior (v, sv).
I Lemma 41. For any (v, s) ∈WNA and corresponding (v, sv) we find that aVal(v, sv) =
aVal(v, s) = cVal(v, s) < cVal(v, sv).
The construction. We now construct a parameterized automatonM from σ that either
realizes a single maximal strategy, or a maximal uniform chain. The parameterized automaton
is identical to the one realizing σ everywhere except at the (v, s) ∈ WNA. In particular,
if WNA = ∅, we are done. Otherwise, for each (v, s) ∈ WNA we make the following
modifications: If aVal(v, sv) ≤ 0, we modify the automaton to act in (v, s) as it does in
(v, sv). If aVal(v, sv) > 0, then we add green edges to let the automaton act in (v, s) as in
(v, sv), and red edges to act as it would do originally.
Correctness. The comparison of the values lets us conclude via Lemma 23 that the param-
eterized automaton M either realizes a single strategy dominating σ, or a uniform chain
dominating σ.
It remains to argue that the strategy/uniform chain realized byM is maximal. Let σn be
the strategy whereM is initialized with n ∈ N. Assume that τ  σn, and let h be a witness
of τ  σn according to Lemma 23, i.e. satisfying cVal(h, τ) > aVal(h, σn). Since σn  τ , we
have cVal(h, σn) ≤ aVal(h, τ), so aVal(h, σn) ≤ cVal(h, σn) ≤ aVal(h, τ) ≤ cVal(h, τ) with
one inequality being strict. In particular, h is a witness of non-admissibility of σn. By
construction ofM the next move after h must be given by a red edge. This already implies
that ifM realizes a single strategy, then that strategy is maximal.
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Let m be the size of the parameterized automatonM, let t be the size of the automaton
realizing τ , and N = mt+ 1.
I Lemma 42. At any maximal history compatible with σN and τ , σN will follow a green or
black edge next.
Proof. Assume there were such a history hv compatible with both σN and τ where σN is
about to apply a red edge, being in state s. If the combination (v, s) has been reached more
than t times during hv, then it has to hold that on histories extending hv, τ always acts at v
asM does following the green edge at (v, s), for τ cannot count up to t+ 1 (in particular, h
is maximal for being compatible with τ and σN ). It follows that aVal(hv, τ) ≤ 0. Let h′v be
a prefix of this form of hv compatible with σn not ending in a red edge (this exists, since
n > m). Then aVal(h′v, τ) ≤ 0, and since τ  σn, aVal(h′v, σn) = aVal(v, sv) ≤ 0. But then
when constructingM, we would not have placed red and green edges at (v, sv), leading to a
contradiction. Thus, at any maximal history compatible with σN and τ , σN will follow a
green or black edge next.
If the combination (v, s) has been visited at most t times during hv, then there has to be
some other pair of counter access state s′ and vertex v′ which was reached more often than t
times during hv by the pigeon hole principle (for since σN is about to follow a red edge, it
has reached a counter access state at least N = mt + 1 many times), with σN taking the
green edge there. Again, by the same reasoning as above, τ always follows the green edge at
the corresponding histories, leading to the conclusion that the antagonistic value obtained
by τ there is 0, and ultimately a contradiction to s′ being created as a counter access state
when constructingM. J
If τ is part of a chain (τi)i∈N with (σi)i∈N v (τi)i∈N, then τ and σN have a common
upper bound τ ′. We proceed to show that this suffices to conclude τ  σN . This completes
our argument, since by induction it follows that if (σn)n∈N v (τn)n∈N, then also (τn)n∈N v
(σn)n∈N.
I Lemma 43. If τ and σN have common upper bound τ ′, then τ  σN .
Proof. We proceed by ruling out all candidates for witnesses of non-dominance of τ by σN ,
and conclude our claim by Lemma 23. Any candidate is a maximal history h compatible
with both σN and τ .
Case 1. Either h is not compatible with τ ′, or τ ′(h) 6= σN (h).
If h is not compatible with τ ′, then h has a longest prefix h′ compatible with τ ′. If
h is compatible with τ ′, but τ ′(h) 6= σN (h), we set h′ = h. By Lemma 42, h′ cannot
be a witness of non-admissibility of σN , and by Lemma 23 it cannot be a witness of
non-dominance of σN by τ ′, since σN  τ ′. Lemma 38 then gives us that h′ is not a
witness of non-dominance of τ ′ by σN , i.e. cVal(h′, τ ′) ≤ aVal(h′, σN ). Together with
σN  τ ′ we get that aVal(h′, σN ) = cVal(h′, σN ). Since h is compatible with σN and
extends h′, it follows that aVal(h′, σN ) = aVal(h, σN ) = cVal(h, σN ). Since τ  τ ′, it
follows that cVal(h′, τ) ≤ cVal(h′, τ ′) = aVal(h′, σN ). Since h is compatible with τ and
extends h′, it follows that cVal(h, τ) ≤ cVal(h′, τ) ≤ aVal(h′, σN ) = aVal(h, σN ), i.e. that
h is not a witness of non-dominance of τ by σN .
Case 2. h is compatible with τ ′ and τ ′(h) = σN (h).
Consider the subgame starting after that move. Since we have chosen N sufficiently big,
in this subgame it is impossible for σN to pass through a red edge without previously
passing through a green edge at the same vertex. By construction, this ensures that
σN is still preadmissible in this subgame. Since reaching the subgame is compatible
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with τ ′ and σN , restricting to this subgame, we still have that σN  τ ′. Thus, we
can apply Lemma 40 to the subgame, and conclude that aVal(h, τ ′) = aVal(h, σN )
and cVal(h, τ ′) = cVal(h, σN ). Since h cannot be a witness of non-dominance of τ by
τ ′, it holds that cVal(h, τ) ≤ aVal(h, τ ′) = aVal(h, σN ). Thus, h is not a witness of
non-dominance of τ by σN either. J
J
D Proofs omitted from Subsection 4.3
The proof of Proposition 34.1 is based on the following auxiliary Lemma, whose demonstration
relies on the study of the loops that appear in witnesses of non dominance.
I Lemma 44. Let G be a generalised safety/reachability game, let M be a parametrized
automaton over the game graph of G, and let (Tn)n∈N be the sequence of finite-memory
strategies realized byM. Then for every pair of integers n1, n2 > |G||M| satisfying Tn1 6 Tn2 ,
there exists 0 < k ≤ |G||M| such that for every i ∈ N, Tn1+(i−1)k 6 Tn2+(i−1)k.
Proof of Proposition 34.1. Let G be a generalised safety/reachability game, and let S be a
parametrized automaton over the game graph of G. We denote by (Sn)n∈N the sequence of
finite-memory strategies realized by S. Let N = |G||S|.
Let US denote the set composed of the integers n satisfying Sn 6 Sn+1. It is clear that
if US is not empty, then (Sn)n∈N is not a chain. Conversely, if US is empty, then (Sn)n∈N
is a chain, since for every pair of integers n1 < n2, we have Sn1  Sn1+1  . . .  Sn2 .
Let us suppose, towards building a contradiction, that the minimal element m of US is
strictly greater than N. Then, we obtain from Lemma 44 that there exists an integer k > 0
such that Sm−k 6 Sm−k+1 by setting i = 0. This contradicts the minimality of m. As a
consequence, m ≤ N. This proves that (Sn)n∈N is a chain if and only if Si  Si+1 for every
1 ≤ i ≤ N. J
